At the time many were high for the process

Promised by Silvio Berlusconi, the rescue of Alitalia presents all the characteristics of the State intervention arbitrary, contrary to the basic rules of competition and the market economy. Deficit over a decade, the Italian company survived until our days at the price of regular injections of public funds, for an estimated total amount of EUR 5.5 billion. As the new Alitalia, although his round table is essentially private, thus avoiding the Government having to return to the pot, she would have certainly not seen the day without the political will of the current Prime Minister and a change on measurement of the Bankruptcy Act, which will necessarily result in an additional cost Italian taxpayers. Leaving to the new company the possibility to resume good profitable assets, debts and the loss-making activities, Rome accepted de facto, not only did not recover its money, but yet to resolve itself, ultimately the billion euros of debt of Alitalia. Evidence already widely denounced in the Italian press on the subject of privatization of profits and socialization of losses, and may assert in Rome, the wrath of Brussels.

However, this new hitch to the rules of the European Union is not the first. Prior to Alitalia, Air France had his salvation, in 1994, to the helping hand of the State, under the form of a cheque for 20 billion francs (3.05 billion), equivalent to all of the benefits accumulated in European air transport. At the time, many were high for the process. The Commission European was not in rest, who considered that "in view of the huge Air France debt ..., the accumulation of losses and the specificities of the sector of air transport ..., a private investor based its decision on rational criteria cannot hope to gain a return sufficient investment in question even in the long term".

Fourteen years later, it is clear that the Commission was wrong. Become the first global air group, with the acquisition of KLM, Air France amply justified the investment. Alone, privatization in two times of the company will be reported total EUR 1.3 billion to public finance (8.6 billion francs). But the State is also largely paid by the tax on profits paid each year by the Group since his return to balance in 1997. On its last fiscal year 2007-2008, Air France-KLM and paid taxes EUR 358 million. These tax revenues to add dividends received by the State as a shareholder, although this sum is reduced with its participation. Is 58 cents per share last year, they are more than 27 million euros still landed in the State in 2008. Not to mention tax revenues generated by 104,000 employees of the Air France-KLM group or the product of the VAT on 7,19 billions of euros of purchases made year last by the France group.

Bleak predictions of Brussels, the bailout of Air France will have therefore been an excellent case for the State, as were those of Iberia Madrid or Tap Air Portugal by Lisbon, also decried by Brussels. Many companies that would not survive without the support of their Governments and whose disappearance would certainly not had to consumers or to the country's economy. In his time, Lufthansa had also received a Government boost. Even British Airways, but privatized more than twenty years ago, would probably not reach the same performance without the anti-competitive practices of his Government, which has managed to maintain protectionist barriers to London-Heathrow last March.

Strict compliance rules of the competition nevertheless gave better results, for example by promoting the development of new private competitors more efficient It was probably the purpose sought by the European Commission. But then again, it is clear that few European companies do not have benefited from a lifeline public, such as Sabena and Swiss, have today disappeared, their private successors have not been able to take up the slack. Swiss was bought by Lufthansa, which is also about to return to Brussels Airlines. Similarly, the existence of a protected national company is not paradoxical to the development of competition, as shown in the example of Ryanair with Aer Lingus and Air One with Alitalia. And if Air liberty and AOM in France have not been able to impose himself on the French market to Air France, it is more because of the mismanagement of their leaders, glaring in the case of Air Lib, than by the anticompetitive advantages granted to Air France.

What wonder about the relevance of the liberal criteria advocated by the European Commission for air transport and to encourage the Italian Government to further criticism of Brussels. As for the first time, this ultimate departure from the rules of competition would result from actual structural measures, with the focus of the network, discontinuation of loss-making activities and particularly 4.500 to 7.000 deletions of posts on a total of 18,000. Therefore one can not make Alitalia the criticism in his time to Air France, to the maintenance of overmanning and the benefits of its staff by the taxpayer.